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Abstract
This paper uses panel data from the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE) to study the eﬀect of care-giving on retirement. The find-
ings suggest that care- and support-giving contributes to the retirement decision,
in particular for men. While the frequency of care activities is more influential in
the male retirement decision, the most important factor for both genders turns out
to be out-of-household care.
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1 Introduction
Older workers frequently engage in support and care activities for people in their social
networks. Aside from the growing market for institutional, mobile and in-house care for
older adults, informal support and care activities have maintained their importance within
the larger family context. In the light of financing constraints of public expenditures for
elderly care, traditional care-giving in the social network might not be fully substituted
by professional care in any case. For older workers, such activities are typically increasing
pressures on their leisure time as many of them reallocate their time budgets towards
fewer hours of labor supply. At the same time, the extent to which older workers engage
in such activities determines the extent of labor supply reduction, in many cases leading
to a full withdrawal from the labor force, and - if eligibility rules allow - to the take-
up of retirement. This paper attempts to quantify the eﬀect of informal support or
care on retirement. Yet, we realize that support activities materialize in various ways
and intensities, not only in the form of classical parental care-giving in the household.
Consequently, we see the need to define support and care-giving as broadly as possible in
order to capture these important variations, ranging from minimal household help on an
occasional basis up to intense daily care 'around the clock'.
This paper investigates the eﬀect of support and care-giving of older workers on retirement,
taking into account a comprehensive set of dimensions over which these activities span.
The novelty of our approach is a rather broad definition of such activities, exploiting
recent survey data on older people in Europe. Our findings underline the importance
of care-giving for the retirement decision, showing behavioral diﬀerences across gender,
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intensity, and type of activity.
The empirical strategy entwines around a binary indicator of retirement as the dependent
variable. Two diﬀerent specifications are deployed in order to capture the eﬀect of care
and support giving on retirement. First, the 'bird perspective' approach with a unique
indicator variable for engaging in any sort of activity related to support or care on an
informal basis. In order to better understand the particular factors for care-givers to take
up retirement, our second specification uses variables spreading out the numerous aspects
and dimensions of support and care activities. We consider informal care only which
naturally excludes care professionals, except they were to provide care or support during
their leisure time to people in their social networks.
The following section discusses previous findings on the determinants of the retirement
decision and on informal care-giving.
2 Previous related literature
Many studies have been dealing with the retirement decision, yet, causal factors like infor-
mal care-giving only recently got more attention. Financial incentives have been identified
as important determinants of the retirement decision by Gruber and Wise (2004); pension
benefit computations frequently embed behavioral signals with respect to the timing of
retirement. Another strand of research is the coordination of retirement among couples;
Blau (1998) and more recently Bingley and Lanot (2007) find evidence of joint retirement,
implying that there exist preferences among couples for sharing retirement leisure. Further
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considerations for retirement stem from someone's health status: Rust and Phelan (1997)
and Sammartino (1987) draw their attention to health status and find evidence of poor
health increasing the propensity of early retirement. Authors such as Hurd (1996) deal
with institutional arrangements encouraging retirement, for instance, mandatory retire-
ment rules, the cost of older labor, and age discrimination. On the demand side for labor,
employers' attitudes towards older workers bear substantial implications for retirement
behavior. However, these ideas have so far not been fully investigated.
Another important feature for the retirement decision is care-giving within one's social
network or family. Let us now turn to the discussion of this relatively young research
agenda. Two major directions have been investigated, the nature of informal-care as a
good, and the impact of informal care on labor supply dimensions. Considering the first
line of research, Bolin et al. (2008) test whether informal care by children or grandchildren
is a substitute or complement to formal care. They find that formal and informal care are
substitutes, and informal care is a complement to doctor and hospital visits. Likewise,
Bonsang (2009) investigates the question whether informal care by adult children is a sub-
stitute for formal long-term care. They find that informal and formal long-term care are
substitutes, independent of the degree of disability of the person given care to. Moreover,
Van Houtven and Norton (2004) find that informal care reduces formal home care use and
delays entry into nursing home services. So, for the financing of the increasing demand
for elderly care, the findings related to the substitutability of formal and informal care
might become important for policy in near future.
Labor supply aspects have been approached from various angles. Summarizing the find-
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ings of the rudimentary 'older' literature, Gorey et al. (1992) point out that up to a third
of informal care-giving leads to labor market exit. Dentinger and Clarkberg (2002) em-
phasize the importance of the closeness of care-giver and care recipient and of the gender
of the care-giver when analyzing the eﬀect of informal care-giving on retirement. Also,
Van Houtven et al. (2013) find an eﬀect of care-giving on hours of work and wages, but
only for females. Skira (2015) find that females have low probabilities to return to their
job after a spell of leave from work for the purpose of care-giving. Lee et al. (2015) point
out that females on lower household income are more likely to provide informal care. Also,
He and McHenry (2016) find a strong link between informal care-giving and the work-
place. Reverting the chain of causality, they conclude that for women at per-retirement
age, working 10 percent more hours results in a decrease of the probability of providing
informal care. Vlachantoni (2010) also stresses the gender diﬀerences of care-giving activ-
ities. An interesting side issue has been investigated by Jacobs et al. (2015) who attempt
to identify whether women giving informal care have diﬀerent patterns of labor force par-
ticipation according to the generation they belong to. They contrast 'Baby Boomers' and
the generation born pre-World-War II, finding no evidence of intergenerational gaps in
hours of work and labor force participation.
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we decompose care and
support giving into important dimensions to study in depth the conditions under which
these activities contribute to retirement. Second, we apply a rather broad notion of
informal care- and support-giving going beyond the definitions previously used. Finally,
novel micro-data has become available for Europe which serves as a base of most current
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empirical evidence. The next section discusses the empirical strategy and the data used.
3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Empirical model
In order to estimate the retirement impact of care- and support-giving of older workers,
we use a binary logit model in which y∗is the underlying latent variable, the propensity
to retire, according to
y∗ = x′β + u (1)
where x′ is a vector of explanatory variables including care and support variables, per-
sonal attributes, country and year fixed eﬀects. Since y∗is not observed, we use observed
retirement choices, where a value of one represents the status of retirement; a value of
zero stands for any labor market status other than retired (employed, unemployed, etc.).
The error term u follows a logistic distribution. The latent variable and the observed
dependent variable relate to each other in the following way:
y =

1 if y∗ > 0
0 if y∗ ≤ 0
(2)
The marginal eﬀects implied by the estimates can legitimately be interpreted as ceteris-
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paribus causal impacts on the probability to retire. We run regressions separately by
gender, while two model specifications are deployed for each gender.
First, we estimate an equation with a single explanatory variable for giving support or
care. The variable Care is coded as a dummy just indicating support- or care-giving, no
matter how intense or how frequent this engagement is (specification 1). Second, we use
a specification based on a set of variables capturing various crucial aspects of support and
care activities. These variables include information about the location of care, i.e., inside
or outside the household of the care-giver, then, the time spent on giving support or care,
and, finally, the number of people receiving care or support (specification 2).
Yet, the decision to retire on the one hand and giving informal care or support on the
other hand, potentially raise concerns about reversed causality. In case someone retired
in order to give more care, one could observe an increase in care activities at the time
of retirement. If such an increase happened, a strong argument for the presence of endo-
geneity could be made. Therefore, we run both model specifications with care variables
lagged by one period. We also consider a panel fixed eﬀects approach. However, this
would be problematic due to the high proportion of single-observation cross-sections, but
also because of the small number of time periods in the panel in general, i.e., a maximum
of three observations per cross-section.
3.2 Data and sample selection
For the empirical analysis, data from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) are used. Observations come from waves one, two, and four, appended
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into a panel of older workers. The logic of the analysis requires that people included in
the panel experience the transition from paid work into formal retirement. Retirement
is an absorbing state, therefore, we include the first year of retirement only, but not
the second and consecutive years. The panel only includes people taking up retirement
during the years observed in the panel window, but not before. Furthermore, we do
not impose the restriction that every person needs to retire while being observed. Thus,
the interpretation of the final output of the regression analysis is, in fact, the predicted
probability of retirement conditional on having worked before retirement. The empirical
definition of one's labor force status before receiving a pension is indeed not a trivial
exercise; possible transitions into retirement could also stem from people never employed
or working. We chose to stick to a rather broad notion of work over time, such that each
person included reports a minimum of one observed episode of work before retirement.
Therefore, with respect to their labor force status, we include people reporting to be
employed, self-employed, civil servant, unemployed, homemaker or to be retired during
any interview year.
The descriptive and regression analysis are done separately by gender. Here, the male
sample consists of 4,639 persons observed over 7,052 observations. In the female sample,
there are 4,157 persons spanning over 6,333 observations. Both samples include the age
groups between 55 and 70. Excluded are people over the age of 70 since these cohorts are
unlikely to follow standard patterns of retirement.
Interviews for wave one of SHARE were conducted in 2004 and 2005, for wave two in
2006 to 2007, and for wave four in 2011 to 2012. Wave three had to be excluded because
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it was designed to retrieve work histories and other retrospective life course information.
Naturally, the panel is unbalanced and has some degree of attrition. Therefore, most
individuals are not observed in all three waves, and they may join the panel as refreshments
after wave one.
We had to drop several observations due to missing values in key variables. We also
excluded observations from countries where very few interviews had been conducted.
Also, some countries joined SHARE in wave three, and therefore those observations were
dropped. However, the set of countries used in the present paper comprises of all major
economies in Europe such that our results can be generalized in a meaningful way. In fact,
observations come from Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France,
Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Denmark. Finally, we
dropped a few implausible outliers. This resulted in two panels separated by gender,
including 8,796 individuals over 13,385 person-year observations.
The subsequent section discusses descriptive statistics of these samples, in particular,
summary measures of the support and care variables.
4 Descriptive statistics
4.1 Sample characteristics
Observations in the male sample have an average age of 59.6 years, female observations
average at 59.3 years of age (Table 1). No important gender diﬀerentials exist for self-
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reported health; the means of the health variable range between very good and good
health across both samples. 87.1 percent of men and 75.2 percent of women live together
with their partner or spouse in a household. This diﬀerential is likely to be explained
by a generally higher life expectancy of women. Education years come close across both
samples at around twelve years. The number of children is on average 2.1 for men and
two for women. The analysis also includes a set of country dummies, for which summary
measures are not reported in Table 1. Finally, a set of year dummies complete the range
of variables. We might note that the period 2008 to 2010 is not included in the samples
due to the specific design of wave three in SHARE.
[Insert Table 1 here]
4.2 Dimensions of informal care and support
SHARE provides a set of discrete survey questions covering various aspects of giving care
or support to other people. In Table 2, we report summary statistics and explain the
content of the care variables used in the analysis; these variables will be denoted in italics
throughout. We construct the comprehensive dummy variable Care indicating any kind
and extent of care- and support-giving. In fact, 31.8 percent of male observations are
coming from personal care or household help, both within and outside the household.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In the female sample, this share is higher as we would expect, amounting to 37.5 percent.
The dummy variable Incare is defined as giving daily care in the household, which we
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would hypothesize to be a rather intense activity. It has a higher share of women, 4.4
percent, in contrast to men with only 3.7 percent. For Carehelp, a dummy variable
indicating care or household help outside the household - which also reports activities
less frequent than daily - is higher for women (34.5 percent) compared to men (28.4
percent). Caretime, a categorical variable indicating the extent of care in terms of time
devoted to these activities, is higher for females as well. As a minor shortcoming, SHARE
only reports Caretime in case the activity happens outside the household, but not for
in-household care. In terms of the number of people given care to, again females are
topping males, while in both genders the average number of people cared for is less than
one on average.
Table 3 outlines the contrast of care activities before and during the year of retirement.
In case these activities were to increase, we could could hypothesize that people retire in
order to give more care. However, care activities remain relatively stable before and in
the retirement period. The share of people giving care, captured by the variable Care, is
31.1 percent before and 31 percent upon retirement for males. For females, we compare
38.1 percent before to 34 percent in the retirement period. Therefore, an increase in
care activities during the retirement cannot be observed. The only variable showing
a considerable increase is Caretime, but only in the male case. Here, the mean goes
up by approximately ten percentage points in the period of retirement. In summary,
the descriptive evidence does not support the proposition of major change in behaviour
towards care activity during the year of retirement.
[Insert Table 3 here]
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5 Results
We now turn to the discussion of the regression results, which are reported in Table 4 for
specification one and in Table 2 for specification 2. In order to use a more intuitive way of
interpreting logit coefficients, we report both, odds ratios, and average marginal eﬀects.
Finally, in order to better grasp the extent of the eﬀect of care-giving on retirement, we
compute predicted probabilities of retirement over age, contrasting care-givers versus non-
care-givers. In general, model specification one shows that care mainly matters for males
in their retirement decision. This eﬀect for males is however relatively small compared
to factors like age, income, and cohabitation. For females, health does not impact on
the retirement decision. Model specification two shows a stronger impact of specific care
activities and of the intensity of such activity on retirement. This holds relative to other
covariates, but also in comparison to specification one.
5.1 Results: one care dummy
Specification one uses a single dummy variable for giving care or household help. For
the male sample, this dummy variable is significant, but not for the females. We may
interpret the eﬀect of care on retirement in following way: in case a male person is giving
care, his odds of retiring are 1.26 times higher than for a male not giving care. We do
not interpret the odds ratio for females due to its statistical insignificance. Regarding
the other covariates, we receive significant estimates for Age, Age2 (only females), some
health categories (only males), for living in a household with a partner, for the number
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of kids (only females) and for some positions in the income distribution. Also, a majority
of country dummies and year eﬀects is significant. However, years of education turn
out to be insignificant. Deploying the corresponding marginal eﬀects interpretation, the
probability of retirement increases by two percentage points when giving care as opposed
to not giving care. Yet, the magnitude of this eﬀect is among the smallest compared to
other covariates.
[Insert Table 4 here]
5.2 Results: care variables
This specification uses, instead of a single dummy for care, a set of variables of care in and
outside the household, the frequency of care activities, and the number of people cared
for. For males and females, results are considerably diﬀerent. In the male case, the only
significant variable is Caretime. When the frequency of care goes from daily or almost
daily to no care, the odds of retirement is reduced by a factor of 0.41. If care activity
goes from daily or almost daily to less than monthly, the odds of retirement go down by
a factor of 0.46. In summary, more time spent on care activities increases the probability
of retirement as we may expect. For females, giving care or household help outside the
household increases the odds of retirement by a factor of 1.8. The other care variables
for women turn out to be insignificant. Simultaneously, the remaining covariates largely
preserve their significance compared to specification one. In terms of average marginal
eﬀects, the significant care variables in both data sets are of considerable magnitudes
compared to the covariates. In case men went from daily to less than monthly care fre-
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quencies, a decrease of the probability of retirement by 7.5 percentage points would arise.
When women provide care or household help outside their household, their probability of
retirement increases by 4.7 percentage points. Other covariates exhibit eﬀects of various
magnitudes; cohabitation has lower marginal eﬀects of 3.4 and 2.6 percentage points for
males and females, respectively. Yet, age clearly has the highest impact on retirement.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Finally, turning to the goodness-of-fit of the models estimated, no important diﬀerences
exist across specifications and gender in terms of choices correctly predicted. The pro-
portion of correctly predicted retirement choices for specification one is 88.4 percent for
both, males and females. Specification 2 yields a model fit of 88.3 percent for males and
88.6 percent for women. Therefore, we obtain relatively strong goodness-of-fit across all
models.
6 Robustness checks
Our robustness checks address the issue of potential endogeneity in the equations esti-
mated before. Two strategies are deployed to this end, first, a replacement of current
period care variables by their one-year lags. Second, we specify an instrumental variables
estimation (two stage least squares) in which the potential candidate for endogeneity,
Care, is instrumented.
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6.1 Lagged care variables
Let us first consider the rationale for this approach. In case we suspect an explanatory
variable to be endogenous, we might choose to replace the contemporary values of this
variable by their lagged values. This approach of lagging variables in order to remedy
endogeneity has been deployed in many studies, for instance recently in Buch et al. (2013)
and Stiebale (2011) among numerous others.
In this study, we suspect the variable Care to be contemporaneously correlated with the
error term. We hope to remove this endogeneity by replacing current year care with its
one-year lag. Due to the short time horizon of the panel - we remember that an individual
is observed at most three points in time - it would be unreasonable to go beyond the one-
year lag. For individuals with only one observation in time, we leave Care at their current
values.
How do the estimates diﬀer from the results presented earlier (see Table 6 and Figure
2). Overall, specification 1 with coefficients of the CareLag dummy comes quite close
to its current period counterpart. For males, the odds ratios of Care are 1.26 and 1.57,
respectively, where in the lag-specification, CareLag achieves a higher level of significance.
In both specifications, the odds ratios for females remain insignificant.
In specification two, the significance of CarehelpLag switches from females to males; in
case of CaretimeLag the switch happens in the revered direction. As before for contem-
poraneous care, OuthelpnumberLag remains insignificant for both genders.
[Insert Table 6 here]
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6.2 Instrumental variables estimation
So far, we have not yet determined whether Care(Lag) are actually endogenous or not.
Therefore, we perform an instrumental variable estimation and subsequently a test for
endogeneity. In a two-stage least squares estimation, we instrument the variable Care by
the variable Outhelpnumber ; the same is repeated for the lagged spefication. In the first-
step equation, a care-giving probability is predicted, while the second step these predicted
probabilities are used to estimate the retirement decision. In Tables 7 and 8, we report
the results, first for contemporaneous, then for lagged care.
[Insert Table 7 here]
[Insert Table 8 here]
Following the estimations, we test for exogeneity of Care(Lag) (see Tables 7 and 8).
Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests reveal that in case of lagged care, the H0 of exogeneity
cannot be rejected, while for contemporaneous care, males’ estimates turn out to be
endogenous. Hence, OLS and IV estimates are similar, and the presence of endogeneity
is unlikely (except for males with contenporaneous care - which is not a big issue in this
context). Regarding the weakness of the instrument, Outhelpnumber(Lag) turns out to be
a relatively strong instrument for Care(Lag). The partial R2 of the first-stage regression
is relatively high in all estimates, and so is the first-stage F-statistic.
Hence, a two-stage least squares approach discloses that endogeneity is not an important
issue. Finally, across all econometric techniques, results do show some degree of variation,
but these non-congruencies are dispensable.
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7 Predicted retirement probabilities
In order to complete the analysis of the eﬀect of care on retirement, we compare predicted
probabilities to retire of care-givers versus non-care-givers. Since age is a crucial factor
in the decision to retire, we depict predicted retirement probabilities over age (Figure 1).
The diﬀerences of these retirement probabilities are visible as the discrepancies between
the two probability functions in each picture. Overall, the pure eﬀect of care on retirement
reaches a maximum of approximately three percentage points for males, and 1.6 for females
at the age of 63.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In general, the age profiles reveal higher probabilities of retirement in case of giving care.
Both specifications deliver quite consistent patterns, while confidence intervals for the
predictions are greater for males than for females. As an example for males' behavior, the
probability of retirement at age 63 is 72.6 percent when giving care and 69.6 percent when
not giving care. Therefore, the probability eﬀect of care on retirement is three percentage
points at this age. For women, this eﬀect is about half in magnitude, 1.6 percent. At the
female age of 63, the retirement probability amounts to 83.6 percent for care-givers, and
to 82 percent for non-care-giving. Thus, care-giving turns out to have a greater impact
on men.
Also, we repeat the computation of age profiles of predicted retirement probabilities, but
now with lagged care variables (Figure 2). In comparison to the profiles in Figure 1, it
becomes apparent that diﬀerentials of retirement probabilities of care versus non-care-
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givers increase for males. Yet, no important diﬀerences to the aforementioned results
emerge.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we attempted to investigate the eﬀect of care-giving on retirement in general
and the underlying circumstances in particular. The notion of care- and support-giving
activity was defined as broad as possible. Therefore our results - in the lack of imposing
many restrictions on the sample used - should be read with the expectation of identifying
an eﬀect, but not an eﬀect with maximum precision. Yet, robustness checks across some
econometric techniques did not yield substantial diﬀerences with respect to the magni-
tudes and significance of the parameters estimated.
Two specifications were used to conduct the analysis. It turned out that care activities
and the intensity of care play a considerable role in the decision to retire. Important
variations across gender arise in our results. In the single care-dummy specification,
significance was achieved in the male sample only, amounting to a crude eﬀect of care
and support increasing the probability of retirement. Specification two decomposed the
activities into their dimensions. For males, the intensity of care matters most for their
retirement decision; for both genders, giving care outside the own household is the most
important trigger.
Overall, the results indicate that informal care and support has an impact on males retir-
17
ing. For females, there is no important eﬀect which might be understood as a persistence
of traditional role models within the family.
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Appendix of tables and figures
Table 1 Sample characteristics
Variable Description Males Females
Mean SD Mean SD
Retirement cases Dummy, 1 if retired, 0 otherwise 0.147 0.354 0.139 0.346
Income decile Position in income distribution 6.859 2.608 6.485 2.687
Age Age at interview 59.553 3.237 59.256 3.162
Health Self-perceived, 1 if excellent, ..., 5 if poor 2.637 0.991 2.636 0.987
Partnerhh Cohabitation dummy, 1 if yes, 0 otherwise 0.871 0.335 0.752 0.432
Education Years of education 12.303 4.305 12.122 4.074
Kids Number of children 2.113 1.1228 2.044 1.175
N 7,052 6,333
Persons 4,639 4,157
Source: Author's own calculations based on SHARE, wave 1, 2, and 4
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Table 2 Care-giving variables, in percent of observations
Variable Description Males Females
Care Dummy, 1 if giving care or support, 0 if no 31.07 37.50
Incare (in household) Dummy giving daily care 3.70 4.42
Carehelp (out of household) Dummy, care or support 28.42 34.47
Caretime (out of household) no help 74.56 69.62
less often 9.34 7.53
almost monthly 6.34 6.96
almost weekly 7.36 11.38
almost daily 2.40 4.50
Outhelpnumber (out of household) Number of people given care to 0.368 0.428
N 7,052 6,333
Persons 4,639 4,157
Source: Author's own calculations based on SHARE, wave 1, 2, and 4
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Table 3 Incidence of care before and in retirement period
Variable Males Females
Mean before Mean in ret. period Mean before Mean in ret. period
Care 0.311 0.31 0.381 0.340
Incare 0.037 0.035 0.045 0.036
Carehelp 0.284 0.288 0.35 0.314
Caretime 0.52 0.637 0.74 0.716
Outhelpnumber 0.361 0.404 0.43 0.411
N 6,015 1,037 5,454 879
Source: Author's own calculations based on SHARE, wave 1, 2, and 4
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Table 4 Logit regression - single care dummy
Males Females
Dep. var.: Retired Coef. OR ME Coef. OR ME
Care 0.231 1.26 0.02 -0.005 0.995 0
(2.50)* (-0.05)
Age 1.249 3.488 0.107 2.336 10.339 0.19
(2.46)* (4.30)**
Age2 -0.006 0.994 -0.001 -0.015 0.985 -0.001
(-1.53) (3.40)**
Health excellent omitted omitted
very good 0.234 1.264 0.019 0.102 1.107 0.008
(-1.59) (-0.72)
good 0.364 1.439 0.03 0.231 1.26 0.018
(2.58)** (-1.67)
fair 0.406 1.501 0.034 0.314 1.369 0.025
(2.51)* (-1.9)
poor 0.478 1.613 0.04 0.237 1.267 0.019
(-1.83) (-0.69)
Partnerhh 0.358 1.431 0.031 0.321 1.379 0.026
(2.56)* (2.77)**
Educ -0.018 0.982 -0.002 -0.008 0.992 -0.001
(-1.76) (-0.65)
Kids -0.056 0.945 -0.005 -0.084 0.92 -0.007
(-1.51) (2.12)*
Income decile 1 0.19 1.209 0.015 0.718 2.05 0.061
(-0.84) (3.01)**
2 0.602 1.826 0.052 0.474 1.607 0.038
(2.58)** (2.05)*
3 0.443 1.557 0.037 0.488 1.629 0.039
(2.13)* (2.30)*
4 0.625 1.868 0.054 0.063 1.065 0.005
(3.36)** (-0.3)
5 0.518 1.678 0.044 0.237 1.267 0.018
(2.96)** (-1.19)
6 0.567 1.764 0.049 0.373 1.453 0.029
(3.47)** (2.02)*
7 0.236 1.266 0.019 0.323 1.381 0.025
(-1.47) (-1.78)
8 0.227 1.255 0.018 0.302 1.353 0.024
(-1.47) (-1.69)
9 0.109 1.115 0.009 0.093 1.098 0.007
(-0.71) (-0.53)
10 omitted omitted
Countries Austria 0.702 2.017 0.06 0.455 1.576 0.037
(2.72)** (-1.49)
Germany 0.538 1.712 0.046 0.238 1.269 0.019
(2.74)** (-1.21)
Sweden -0.102 0.903 -0.009 -0.466 0.627 -0.038
(-0.57) (2.98)**
Netherlands 0.808 2.243 0.069 -0.27 0.763 -0.022
(4.31)** -1.36
Spain 0.212 1.236 0.018 -1.257 0.285 -0.102
(-0.92) (3.42)**
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Italy 1.044 2.839 0.089 0.715 2.045 0.058
(4.33)** (3.07)**
France 1.558 4.748 0.133 0.559 1.749 0.045
(7.77)** (3.06)**
Greece -0.956 0.384 -0.082 -1.951 0.142 -0.158
(2.36)* (2.57)*
Switzerland -0.657 0.518 -0.056 -1.207 0.299 -0.098
(3.07)** (5.46)**
Belgium 1.414 4.111 0.121 0.581 1.787 0.047
(7.46)** (2.85)**
Czech Rep. 0.138 1.148 0.012 0.663 1.941 0.054
(-0.68) (2.98)**
Poland -0.17 0.843 -0.015 1.263 3.536 0.103
(-0.34) (2.77)**
Denmark omitted omitted
Years 2004 -3.06 0.047 -0.262 -3.099 0.045 -0.252
(5.52)** (5.86)**
2005 -3.019 0.049 -0.259 -3.125 0.044 -0.254
(4.33)** (3.68)**
2006 -0.864 0.421 -0.074 -0.928 0.395 -0.075
(-1.66) (2.06)*
2007 -1.305 0.271 -0.112 -1.256 0.285 -0.102
(2.60)** (2.91)**
2011 -0.97 0.379 -0.083 -0.846 0.429 -0.069
(-1.91) (-1.92)
2012 omitted omitted
Constant -54.462 -87.902
(3.46)** (5.23)**
LL -1,985.57 -1,688.47
Wald chi2 1,030.49 886.27
p 0.000 0.000
pseudo R2 0.326 0.3381
CPC 0.884 0.884
N 7,052 6,333
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.
CPC refers to the percentage of correctly predicted choices.
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Table 5 Logit regression - care dimensions
Males Females
Dep. var.: Retired Coef. OR ME Coef. OR ME
Incare -0.133 0.876 -0.011 -0.434 0.648 -0.035
(-0.59) (-1.88)
Carehelp -0.236 0.79 -0.02 0.586 1.796 0.047
(-0.72) (2.20)*
Caretime no help -0.891 0.41 -0.086 0.418 1.519 0.034
(2.04)* (-1.08)
less often -0.767 0.465 -0.075 -0.232 0.793 -0.016
(2.79)** (-0.85)
almost monthly -0.401 0.67 -0.042 -0.152 0.859 -0.011
(-1.42) (-0.58)
almost weekly -0.196 0.822 -0.021 -0.296 0.744 -0.02
(-0.71) (-1.22)
almost daily omitted omitted
Outhelpnumber 0.059 1.061 0.005 0.013 1.013 0.001
(-0.5) (-0.1)
Age 1.251 3.494 0.107 2.309 10.061 0.187
(2.45)* (4.22)**
Age2 -0.006 0.994 -0.001 -0.015 0.985 -0.001
(-1.52) (3.32)**
Health excellent omitted omitted
very good 0.224 1.251 0.018 0.088 1.092 0.007
(-1.51) (-0.62)
good 0.357 1.429 0.029 0.224 1.252 0.018
(2.52)* (-1.62)
fair 0.397 1.487 0.033 0.308 1.361 0.025
(2.45)* (-1.85)
poor 0.494 1.639 0.041 0.272 1.312 0.022
(-1.87) (-0.8)
Partnerhh 0.393 1.482 0.034 0.325 1.384 0.026
(2.76)** (2.77)**
Educ -0.019 0.981 -0.002 -0.01 0.99 -0.001
(-1.78) (-0.81)
Kids -0.054 0.947 -0.005 -0.084 0.92 -0.007
(-1.43) (2.11)*
Income decile 1 0.18 1.198 0.014 0.699 2.013 0.059
(-0.79) (2.93)**
2 0.617 1.853 0.053 0.464 1.591 0.037
(2.62)** (2.00)*
3 0.429 1.535 0.036 0.468 1.598 0.038
(2.07)* (2.20)*
4 0.617 1.853 0.053 0.061 1.063 0.005
(3.30)** (-0.29)
5 0.512 1.669 0.043 0.214 1.239 0.016
(2.92)** (-1.08)
6 0.565 1.759 0.048 0.373 1.452 0.029
(3.44)** (2.02)*
7 0.247 1.28 0.02 0.316 1.372 0.025
(-1.54) (-1.76)
8 0.223 1.25 0.018 0.29 1.336 0.022
(-1.44) (-1.63)
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9 0.113 1.119 0.009 0.102 1.108 0.008
(-0.73) (-0.58)
10 omitted omitted
Countries Austria 0.694 2.002 0.059 0.436 1.546 0.035
(2.67)** (-1.43)
Germany 0.558 1.748 0.048 0.242 1.274 0.02
(2.81)** (-1.22)
Sweden -0.089 0.914 -0.008 -0.491 0.612 -0.04
(-0.5) (3.12)**
Netherlands 0.841 2.319 0.072 -0.274 0.761 -0.022
(4.45)** (-1.37)
Spain 0.233 1.262 0.02 -1.268 0.281 -0.103
(-1.0) (3.41)**
Italy 1.052 2.864 0.09 0.707 2.028 0.057
(4.36)** (2.99)**
France 1.574 4.824 0.134 0.55 1.734 0.045
(7.80)** (2.99)**
Greece -0.946 0.388 -0.081 -1.912 0.148 -0.155
(2.33)* (2.51)*
Switzerland -0.637 0.529 -0.054 -1.232 0.292 -0.1
(2.95)** (5.50)**
Belgium 1.394 4.032 0.119 0.586 1.797 0.047
(7.33)** (2.85)**
Czech Rep. 0.132 1.141 0.011 0.659 1.933 0.053
(-0.64) (2.96)**
Poland -0.094 0.91 -0.008 1.276 3.584 0.103
(-0.19) (2.77)**
Denmark omitted omitted
Years 2004 -3.011 0.049 -0.257 -3.164 0.042 -0.256
(5.53)** (5.91)**
2005 -2.898 0.055 -0.247 -3.166 0.042 -0.256
(4.22)** (3.74)**
2006 -0.801 0.449 -0.068 -0.974 0.377 -0.079
(-1.57) (2.14)*
2007 -1.232 0.292 -0.105 -1.307 0.271 -0.106
(2.51)* (2.98)**
2011 -0.928 0.395 -0.079 -0.846 0.429 -0.068
(-1.88) (-1.9)
2012 omitted omitted
Constant -53.772 -87.501
(3.40)** (5.16)**
LL -1,976.02 -1,683.43
Wald chi2 1,035.29 891.13
p 0.000 0.000
pseudo R2 0.3289 0.340
CPC 0.883 0.886
N 7,052 6,333
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.
CPC refers to the percentage of correctly predicted choices.
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Table 6 Results logit regression - lagged care variables
Dependent variable: Males S1 Females S1 Males S2 Females S2
Retired
CareLag 1.572*** 0.960
(5.16) (-0.45)
IncareLag 0.959 0.882
(-0.18) (-0.57)
CarehelpLag 1.778** 1.231
(3.09) (1.29)
CaretimeLag no help 1.413 2.125*
(0.98) (2.16)
less often 1.333 1.693
(0.96) (1.82)
almost monthly 1.158 1.135
(0.47) (0.42)
almost weekly 1.597 1.404
(1.53) (1.24)
almost daily omitted omitted
OuthelpnumberLag 0.972 1.117
(-0.27) (0.84)
age 3.415* 10.356*** 3.439* 9.978***
(2.42) (4.30) (2.44) (4.22)
age2 0.994 0.985*** 0.994 0.985***
(-1.48) (-3.41) (-1.50) (-3.32)
Health excellent omitted omitted omitted omitted
very good 1.262 1.106 1.277 1.106
(1.59) (0.71) (1.66) (0.71)
good 1.436* 1.259 1.449** 1.256
(2.56) (1.67) (2.61) (1.65)
fair 1.489* 1.368 1.526** 1.380
(2.45) (1.89) (2.59) (1.94)
poor 1.642 1.264 1.702* 1.285
(1.90) (0.69) (2.04) (0.74)
Partnerhh 1.424* 1.376** 1.436** 1.381**
(2.54) (2.76) (2.59) (2.78)
Educ 0.981 0.992 0.981 0.990
(-1.81) (-0.65) (-1.80) (-0.79)
Kids 0.947 0.920* 0.949 0.919*
(-1.45) (-2.12) (-1.40) (-2.12)
Income decile 1 1.248 2.041** 1.260 2.055**
(0.97) (3.00) (1.01) (3.02)
2 1.845** 1.600* 1.861** 1.606*
(2.63) (2.03) (2.65) (2.03)
3 1.549* 1.626* 1.564* 1.604*
(2.12) (2.30) (2.18) (2.24)
4 1.885*** 1.065 1.930*** 1.074
(3.38) (0.30) (3.50) (0.34)
5 1.688** 1.263 1.698** 1.240
(2.96) (1.17) (3.00) (1.08)
6 1.819*** 1.451* 1.830*** 1.436*
(3.67) (2.02) (3.69) (1.96)
7 1.299 1.379 1.303 1.366
(1.63) (1.77) (1.64) (1.72)
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8 1.279 1.350 1.290 1.333
(1.59) (1.68) (1.63) (1.61)
9 1.140 1.095 1.142 1.088
(0.86) (0.51) (0.86) (0.47)
10 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Countries Austria 2.186** 1.565 2.198** 1.577
(3.05) (1.47) (3.04) (1.47)
Germany 1.726** 1.266 1.727** 1.251
(2.75) (1.19) (2.73) (1.13)
Sweden 0.883 0.626** 0.872 0.615**
(-0.69) (-2.99) (-0.75) (-3.10)
Netherlands 2.266*** 0.764 2.254*** 0.758
(4.34) (-1.35) (4.30) (-1.39)
Spain 1.360 0.282*** 1.390 0.278***
(1.33) (-3.44) (1.42) (-3.45)
Italy 3.062*** 2.035** 3.078*** 2.064**
(4.65) (3.05) (4.68) (3.07)
France 5.151*** 1.733** 5.187*** 1.735**
(8.10) (2.99) (8.13) (2.98)
Greece 0.412* 0.141** 0.420* 0.142*
(-2.18) (-2.58) (-2.13) (-2.56)
Switzerland 0.549** 0.297*** 0.549** 0.299***
(-2.79) (-5.47) (-2.79) (-5.41)
Belgium 4.182*** 1.784** 4.169*** 1.831**
(7.56) (2.84) (7.52) (2.94)
Czech Republic 1.198 1.928** 1.217 1.968**
(0.89) (2.94) (0.96) (3.01)
Poland 0.874 3.477** 0.885 3.638**
(-0.27) (2.73) (-0.24) (2.79)
Denmark omitted omitted omitted omitted
Years 2004 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.045***
(-5.58) (-5.89) (-5.54) (-5.82)
2005 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.044***
(-4.35) (-3.69) (-4.33) (-3.67)
2006 0.446 0.391* 0.436 0.397*
(-1.59) (-2.08) (-1.61) (-2.02)
2007 0.282** 0.282** 0.278** 0.286**
(-2.59) (-2.93) (-2.58) (-2.86)
2011 0.384 0.425 0.379 0.432
(-1.94) (-1.95) (-1.94) (-1.88)
2012 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-3.44) (-5.23) (-3.48) (-5.19)
Wald chi2 1,039.119 887.539 1,044.026 895.813
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 7,052 6,333 7,052 6,333
Notes: Robust z-statistics in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.
Estimates presented in this table are odds ratios.
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Table 7 Results 2 SLS - IV, contemporaneous care
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
Dependent variable: Care (males) Retired (males) Care (females) Retired (females)
Outhelpnumber 0.483*** 0.488***
(94.917) (88.427)
Care 0.041*** -0.001
(3.798) (-0.068)
Age -0.038 -0.449*** 0.045 -0.416***
(-1.077) (-12.561) (1.100) (-10.977)
Age2 0.000 0.004*** -0.000 0.004***
(1.000) (13.999) (-1.132) (12.370)
Health: excellent omitted -0.038 omitted -0.011
(-1.591) (-0.410)
very good 0.015 -0.025 0.002 -0.003
(1.325) (-1.092) (0.148) (-0.117)
good 0.011 -0.015 -0.013 0.007
(0.964) (-0.646) (-1.023) (0.296)
fair 0.011 -0.009 0.002 0.013
(0.812) (-0.361) (0.112) (0.505)
poor 0.040 omitted -0.015 omitted
(1.695) (-0.534)
Partnerhh -0.022 0.037** -0.026* 0.026**
(-1.900) (3.145) (-2.415) (2.579)
Educ 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000
(1.387) (-1.528) (0.246) (-0.254)
Kids -0.008** -0.004 -0.001 -0.007*
(-2.822) (-1.338) (-0.377) (-2.166)
Income decile: 1 -0.020 0.022 -0.046* 0.060**
(-1.090) (1.159) (-2.107) (2.951)
2 -0.026 0.060** -0.041 0.033
(-1.209) (2.758) (-1.950) (1.698)
3 -0.023 0.043* -0.007 0.037*
(-1.212) (2.300) (-0.359) (2.030)
4 -0.019 0.058*** -0.003 -0.003
(-1.112) (3.340) (-0.147) (-0.154)
5 -0.025 0.037* 0.010 0.014
(-1.598) (2.300) (0.564) (0.880)
6 -0.028* 0.049*** -0.018 0.022
(-1.964) (3.393) (-1.149) (1.506)
7 -0.021 0.010 0.004 0.017
(-1.591) (0.733) (0.253) (1.171)
8 -0.019 0.013 0.002 0.020
(-1.473) (1.001) (0.128) (1.414)
9 -0.025* 0.006 -0.018 0.007
(-2.103) (0.462) (-1.197) (0.478)
10 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Austria 0.022 0.047* 0.019 0.020
(1.031) (2.212) (0.814) (0.941)
Germany 0.022 0.051** 0.034 0.017
(1.243) (2.851) (1.769) (0.989)
Sweden 0.026 -0.012 0.034* -0.045**
(1.685) (-0.795) (2.105) (-3.021)
Netherlands 0.053*** 0.079*** 0.027 -0.017
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(3.356) (4.864) (1.465) (-1.010)
Spain -0.009 0.026 -0.014 -0.084***
(-0.458) (1.320) (-0.584) (-3.704)
Italy -0.001 0.092*** 0.046* 0.050*
(-0.071) (4.763) (2.083) (2.460)
France -0.030 0.131*** 0.003 0.039*
(-1.702) (7.297) (0.186) (2.339)
Greece -0.058** -0.009 -0.042 -0.053
(-2.784) (-0.439) (-1.351) (-1.822)
Switzerland -0.009 -0.048** -0.001 -0.093***
(-0.560) (-2.825) (-0.041) (-5.269)
Belgium 0.026 0.127*** 0.063*** 0.040*
(1.578) (7.739) (3.355) (2.321)
Czechia 0.006 0.007 0.041* 0.029
(0.381) (0.427) (2.074) (1.586)
Poland -0.023 0.005 -0.044 0.086
(-0.638) (0.134) (-0.841) (1.756)
Denmark omitted omitted omitted omitted
Y2004 0.033 -0.183*** 0.014 -0.220***
(0.777) (-4.288) (0.251) (-4.341)
Y2005 0.049 -0.213*** 0.013 -0.233***
(1.071) (-4.540) (0.211) (-4.190)
Y2006 0.069 -0.076 -0.003 -0.139**
(1.620) (-1.763) (-0.051) (-2.714)
Y2007 0.044 -0.116** 0.022 -0.169***
(1.091) (-2.830) (0.418) (-3.400)
Y2011 -0.026 -0.072 -0.088 -0.125*
(-0.630) (-1.738) (-1.639) (-2.508)
Y2012 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Constant 1.370 12.296*** -1.102 11.297***
(1.283) (11.314) (-0.892) (9.855)
chi2 2,696.281 2,451.488
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 7,052 7,052 6,333 6,333
Exogeneity tests
Durbin chi2(1) 7.423 chi2(1) 0.214
p 0.006 p 0.883
Wu-Hausman F(1,7014) 7.423 F(1,6295) 0.214
p 0.007 p 0.884
Instr. weakness
Partial R2 0.562 0.554
1st stage F 9,009.18 7,819.29
p 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.
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Table 8 Results 2 SLS - IV, lagged care
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage
Dependent variable: Care (males) Retired (males) Care (females) Retired (females)
Outhelpnumber 0.278*** 0.269***
(38.442) (34.752)
CareLag 0.041*** -0.009
(3.806) (-0.794)
Age 0.033 -0.453*** 0.062 -0.415***
(0.662) (-12.691) (1.083) (-10.969)
Age2 -0.000 0.004*** -0.001 0.004***
(-0.755) (14.132) (-1.157) (12.360)
Health: excellent omitted -0.039 omitted -0.010
(-1.614) (-0.390)
very good 0.011 -0.025 -0.021 -0.003
(0.644) (-1.106) (-1.154) (-0.106)
good 0.008 -0.015 -0.030 0.007
(0.505) (-0.665) (-1.723) (0.303)
fair 0.023 -0.009 -0.006 0.013
(1.191) (-0.403) (-0.286) (0.520)
poor 0.015 omitted -0.023 omitted
(0.436) (-0.600)
Partnerhh -0.012 0.035** -0.015 0.025*
(-0.733) (3.015) (-1.020) (2.545)
Educ 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000
(1.499) (-1.522) (0.788) (-0.237)
Kids -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.007*
(-1.598) (-1.333) (-0.576) (-2.166)
Income decile: 1 -0.062* 0.023 -0.100** 0.059**
(-2.336) (1.202) (-3.267) (2.896)
2 -0.049 0.060** -0.091** 0.032
(-1.590) (2.749) (-3.106) (1.651)
3 -0.002 0.042* -0.023 0.037*
(-0.059) (2.232) (-0.812) (2.014)
4 -0.018 0.058*** -0.019 -0.003
(-0.724) (3.324) (-0.723) (-0.161)
5 -0.016 0.036* -0.033 0.014
(-0.734) (2.287) (-1.371) (0.859)
6 -0.045* 0.049*** -0.031 0.022
(-2.254) (3.445) (-1.395) (1.486)
7 -0.045* 0.011 -0.021 0.017
(-2.368) (0.796) (-0.928) (1.161)
8 -0.038* 0.014 -0.027 0.019
(-2.057) (1.037) (-1.281) (1.391)
9 -0.046** 0.006 -0.060** 0.006
(-2.690) (0.495) (-2.901) (0.439)
10 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Austria -0.105*** 0.050* -0.144*** 0.019
(-3.521) (2.324) (-4.371) (0.858)
Germany 0.018 0.049** -0.014 0.017
(0.746) (2.787) (-0.520) (0.949)
Sweden 0.062** -0.014 -0.007 -0.045**
(2.819) (-0.921) (-0.328) (-3.044)
Netherlands 0.024 0.078*** 0.016 -0.017
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(1.063) (4.847) (0.640) (-1.018)
Spain -0.153*** 0.028 -0.187*** -0.087***
(-5.594) (1.414) (-5.450) (-3.801)
Italy -0.109*** 0.093*** -0.059 0.049*
(-4.033) (4.822) (-1.885) (2.399)
France -0.135*** 0.132*** -0.141*** 0.037*
(-5.399) (7.356) (-5.665) (2.213)
Greece -0.147*** -0.010 -0.150*** -0.055
(-4.952) (-0.459) (-3.418) (-1.898)
Switzerland -0.114*** -0.047** -0.128*** -0.094***
(-4.754) (-2.716) (-4.815) (-5.341)
Belgium 0.017 0.127*** -0.011 0.040*
(0.731) (7.717) (-0.421) (2.292)
Czechia -0.071** 0.008 -0.104*** 0.027
(-2.977) (0.491) (-3.794) (1.500)
Poland -0.090 0.005 -0.227** 0.083
(-1.746) (0.130) (-3.058) (1.696)
Denmark omitted omitted omitted omitted
Y2004 -0.124* -0.175*** -0.105 -0.221***
(-2.083) (-4.127) (-1.375) (-4.362)
Y2005 -0.107 -0.206*** -0.074 -0.234***
(-1.629) (-4.398) (-0.877) (-4.205)
Y2006 -0.118 -0.067 -0.081 -0.140**
(-1.955) (-1.548) (-1.045) (-2.733)
Y2007 -0.097 -0.110** -0.083 -0.170***
(-1.699) (-2.674) (-1.101) (-3.418)
Y2011 -0.089 -0.070 -0.087 -0.126*
(-1.521) (-1.669) (-1.153) (-2.527)
Y2012 omitted omitted omitted omitted
Constant -0.453 12.403*** -1.233 11.296***
(-0.299) (11.438) (-0.711) (9.855)
chi2 2,706.064 2,451.935
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 7,052 7,052 6,333 6,333
Exogeneity tests
Durbin chi2(1) 0.017 chi2(1) 0.556
p 0.898 p 0.456
Wu-Hausman F(1,7014) 0.016 F(1,6295) 0.552
p 0.898 p 0.457
Instr. weakness
Partial R2 0.514 0.493
1st stage F 7,406.87 6,121.25
p 0.000 0.000
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. (*), (**), (***) indicate p < 0.05, p < 0.01, p < 0.001.
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Figure 1 Predicted retirement probabilities by Care
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Figure 2 Predicted retirement probabilities by CareLag
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